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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism on 
socio-economic performance in twenty developed countries. This paper uses new measurements 
of consensus democracy and corporatism and shows that the positive macroeconomic conse-
quences of consensus democracy and corporatism are generally overestimated and do not hold 
any longer since the 1990s. In analysing the impact of institutions on performance, too broad 
conceptualisations and operationalisations should not be used. Moreover, this paper shows that 
consensus democracy and corporatism have different effects on performance and these differ-
ent types of institutions each have their own dynamics. This means that these institutions must 
not be confused, but clearly be separated. Each of them has different institutional characteristics 
and shows a different impact. They are certainly not the same. This paper shows that neither 
consensus democracy nor corporatism has a very strong and direct impact on socio-economic 
performance. Many effects that were found are weak and most of the effects were dependent on 
other factors, such as the openness of the economy and central bank independence.
This paper is based on Chapters 1 and 5 of my dissertation (Vergunst 2004).
1Introduction
In comparative political economy many theories have been formulated about the relation 
between, on the one hand, politics and institutions and, on the other hand, policy choices and 
socio-economic performance. This paper examines the impact of the institutions of consensus 
democracy and corporatism. In the political-economy literature it is argued that these types 
of institutions contribute to better socio-economic performance, but this paper shows that 
consensus democracy and corporatism do not lead to better socio-economic performance.
 In the 1970s and 1980s several studies argued that corporatist institutions have a positive 
impact on socio-economic performance. In corporatist political economies, workers and 
employers agreed on wage moderation in exchange for employment and welfare provisions. 
Some recent studies still claim the success of corporatism (Crepaz 1992; Compston 1997; 
Wilensky 2002). Wilensky (2002: 482) concludes that corporatist bargaining arrangements 
are among the most important sources of good economic performance and that ʻdemocratic 
corporatism also fosters restraint on nominal wagesʼ. Others claim that this effect disappeared 
or even never existed (Therborn 1987). Flanagan (1999: 1171) found that
ʻa relationship between [collective bargaining] structure and performance probably existed in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, but that relationship had disappeared by the 1990s and may not have existed 
in the 1960sʼ.
Some studies indicate other possible effects, such as a non-linear relationship between corporatist 
institutions and performance. Calmfors & Drifﬁll (1988) found that decentralised or centralised 
wage bargaining structures have better performance than intermediate structures. There is 
wide disagreement in contemporary comparative political economy about the consequences of 
corporatist institutions for socio-economic performance.
 First studies of consensus democracy were focused on the contribution of institutions 
to the stability of the political system. Since the 1990s, the impact of consensus democracy on 
socio-economic performance has been analysed. Again, there is no consensus about the impact 
of consensual institutions. While Crepaz (1996) and Lijphart (1999) found that consensus 
democracy is at least not outperformed by majoritarianism, Anderson (2001) questions the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation as developed by Lijphart (1999) and he found that ʻa 
change from a plurality/single-member district to a PR electoral system would be detrimental 
to performance  ʼ (Anderson 2001: 448). According to Anderson (2001: 450):  ʻthe four core 
elements of consensus democracy are associated with inferior rather than superior performanceʼ. 
Armingeon (2002: 99) concludes that ʻconsensus democracy does not lead to a kinder, gentler 
and better democracy.ʼ
 Lijphartʼs ﬁndings about the impact of consensus democracy on performance may be 
overestimated, since he makes no distinction between different types of institutions. As Lijphart 
includes several strongly diverging institutions in his index of consensus democracy, it becomes 
difﬁcult to determine which institution causes which effect. Therefore at least three elements of 
2Lijphartʼs conceptualisation of consensus democracy must be separated: executive-legislative 
relations, corporatism and federalism (see also Armingeon 2002; Lane & Ersson 2000; Keman 
& Pennings 1995). By incorporating so many different types of institutions in the concept of 
consensus democracy, it has become likely to draw wrong conclusions about its consequences 
for socio-economic policy-making.
 The problem that has to be solved here is that many rivalling theories explain the same 
phenomena. These theories are rejected and conﬁrmed by different kinds of data and research 
methods. This theoretical and empirical puzzle deserves an encompassing study of these crucial 
institutions in comparative political economy.
 This paper shows that the positive impact of consensus democracy and corporatism on 
socio-economic performance has been overstated in comparative political economy. Institutions 
of consensus democracy might contribute to political stability, but they do not lead to superior 
socio-economic performance. Corporatist institutions may have had positive effects in the 
past, but the results of this paper indicate that corporatism is no longer associated with better 
socio-economic performance in the 1990s. The next section presents the theoretical discussion 
of the impact of consensus democracy and corporatism on socio-economic policy-making 
and performance.The subsequent section presents the measures of consensus democracy and 
corporatism that are used. After that section, new empirical ﬁndings are presented. The last 
section presents the conclusions of this paper.
Why do consensus democracy and corporatism matter for socio-economic performance?
Lijphart (1999) and Crepaz (1998) disagree with what they call ʻthe conventional wisdom  ʼthat 
governments in majoritarian democracies are more effective – i.e. that policy implemented in 
these political systems have a stronger effect – and have a higher performance. Lijphart (1999) 
states that consensus democracies are not outperformed by majoritarian democracies and Crepaz 
(1998) argues that consensus democracy contributes to more efﬁcient and responsive decision-
making. A crucial characteristic of consensus democracy is the proportional electoral system. 
Proportionality leads to a better representation of the interests of the people. This is in contrast 
with majoritarian systems that neglect the interests of considerable minority groups.
  The positive effect of consensus democracy on performance is contested by Anderson 
(2001). He concludes that the positive effect of consensus democracy is limited and that the 
effect that Lijphart found in his analysis is mainly caused by corporatism and central bank 
independence, two factors that are part of Lijphartʼs measurement of consensus democracy. The 
operationalisation of consensus democracy by Lijphart (1999) is too broad (Anderson 2001). 
Corporatism and central bank independence are something different from the institutional 
arrangements of consensus democracy and cannot be used as indicators of consensus 
democracy. 
 The research on the effect of corporatism on socio-economic performance has been 
extensive (see Schmidt 1982; Keman, Woldendorp & Braun 1985; Therborn 1987; Crepaz 
31992; Woldendorp 1997; Flanagan 1999; Wilensky 2002 and Schmidt 2002). The general 
argument pro corporatism is that it allows governments to develop more effective socio-
economic policies. Stable corporatist institutions presuppose successful political exchange of 
moderate wage demands against moderate price policies, which contributes to a lower rate of 
unemployment.
 Flanagan (1999) warns against overestimating the effect of corporatism. The effect of 
corporatism is constrained by the time dimension (Flanagan 1999). Corporatism might have 
mattered in the past, but the positive effect on performance has declined. Perhaps corporatism is 
positively related to performance in certain time periods. This positive effect is not very strong 
and sustainable. Moreover, the effect of corporatism is likely to be constrained by international 
developments, such as international political and economic cooperation and international 
ﬂows of trade and capital. The national capacity for macro-economic steering by the state has 
eroded.
 Calmfors & Drifﬁll (1988) argue that the relation between the centralisation of wage 
bargaining and the level of unemployment is hump-shaped. The bargaining modes at the 
extremes, i.e. centralised and decentralised, have lower levels of unemployment than wage 
bargaining at the sector level, which is in between. Unions and ﬁrms at the sector level can try 
to externalise the negative effects of wage drift to other ﬁrms. This is much more difﬁcult at 
macro and ﬁrm level. If ﬁrms and workers are well organised at macro level, they are aware of 
this threat and are more prepared to cooperate.
  During the 1970s and 1980s, the neo-corporatist literature was very optimistic about 
the positive impact of neo-corporatist institutions on performance (Schmidt 1982; Cameron 
1984). In past decades, some authors became sceptical about this relationship (Therborn 1987; 
Calmfors & Drifﬁll 1988; Flanagan 1999). Nowadays a simple one-to-one causal relationship 
between corporatism and performance is ruled out. The positive impact of corporatism may 
depend on other factors, such as consensus democracy, openness of the economy and central 
bank independence.
 In some recent studies the role of the central bank has been linked to corporatism. Franzese 
& Hall (2000) and Iversen (1999) argue that the impact of the central bank independence is 
dependent on the scope and level of wage bargaining. An independent central bank gives a 
higher priority to price stability than political actors do. Higher independence of central banks 
can therefore contribute to better socio-economic performance. Independent central banks only 
manage to keep inﬂation low when collective bargaining systems are able to moderate wage 
demands. This is expressed in the expectation that centralised wage bargaining has a positive 
impact on performance, if accommodated by the monetary regime. Several authors (Iversen 1999; 
Franzese & Hall 2000; Traxler, Blaschke & Kittel 2001) argue that the interaction of central bank 
independence and wage bargaining has an impact on socio-economic performance. Centralised 
and coordinated wage bargaining lead under central bank independence to lower inﬂation rates 
and lower unemployment than decentralised and uncoordinated wage bargaining.
4Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Socio-economic policy can be seen as the result or outcome of the decision-making process. 
Political and economic actors, such as political parties, governments, trade unions and 
employers  ʼorganisations, shape socio-economic policy. A distinction must be made between 
policy outputs and performance. Policy outputs reﬂect the actual implementation of political 
decisions. This output is shaped by actual policy choices. Examples of policy outputs are the 
level of welfare spending or of expenditures on labour market policy. Performance measures the 
actual achievement and the societal effects of policy. Unemployment rates and economic growth 
are indicators of socio-economic performance. Political and economic actors try to decrease the 
unemployment levels by developing speciﬁc types of labour market policy. However, the focus 
of this paper is not to explain performance levels as such, but the extent to which political-
institutional arrangements inﬂuence performance. Central in this analysis is therefore the extent 
to which institutional arrangements matter.
 Corporatist institutional arrangements are conducive to agreements between social 
partners and government on wage moderation, labour market policy and working conditions. 
The main advantage of consensual wage bargaining is that trade unions and employers  ʼ
organisations can agree on a package deal of measures that account for long term interests 
and are broader than only agreements on the level of the wages. In corporatist countries social 
partners develop a socio-economic policy that is in accordance with the national interests rather 
than a situation in which interest groups are only interested in their short-term beneﬁts.
 Institutions are considered to be the intermediates between actors  ʼpreferences and the 
outcomes of the process. This means that the institutional context is supposed to determine the 
output of the decision making process. Institutions are considered to inﬂuence outcomes which 
even may well inﬂuence actors to change or create institutional arrangements in order to adjust 
outputs. Several hypotheses about the relation between institutional arrangements are tested. 
First, corporatist institutions allow agreements between unions and employers  ʼorganisations on 
wage moderation. This will have positive effects on inﬂation and unemployment. The impact 
on economic growth is not necessarily very strong. Corporatism can contribute to consolidation 
of economic growth, but does not lead to a comparative advantage over non-corporatist 
countries per se. The highest priorities of trade unions are employment and social protection for 
their members. Macro-level economic growth is a positive spill over. Second, small countries 
frequently use corporatism as a strategy to safeguard their position on the world market. By 
contrast, large countries will have more difﬁculties with developing corporatist institutions 
(Katzenstein 1985; Olson 1982). Third, the members of interest groups become increasingly 
diffuse. Trade unions were traditionally strongly supported by male blue-collar industry sector 
workers. The strength of this group has weakened with increasing service sector employment 
and increasing labour participation of women and immigrants.
 Decision-making in consensus democracy may seem slow and inefﬁcient; the choices 
made are based on a solid majority, without neglecting the interests of minorities in society 
5(Schmidt 2002: 150). Of course, it is not always possible to make unanimous decisions, but the 
most important function of the institutions of consensus democracy is that relevant groups have 
the opportunity to express their voice. The resulting outcome may be not the most preferred, 
but at least they will agree about the procedure that is used. Hence, the main advantage is that 
decisions made carry a much stronger support. For this reason, Crepaz (1996) argues that policy-
making in consensus democracies is more efﬁcient and more responsive. It is more efﬁcient 
because fewer actors will try to obstruct it and it is more responsive to voters  ʼpreferences, 
because more actors are involved. Therefore, according to Crepaz consensus democracies have 
better performance than majoritarian democracies.
 The welfare state literature has studied development and possible retrenchment of 
welfare states and looked for explanations in historical and demographic ﬁelds. Later, political 
variables, such as the political colour of governments and the strength of social democratic 
and Christian Democratic parties were taken into account as well (Esping-Andersen 1990; Van 
Kersbergen 1995). Institutional arrangements can have consequences for the policy choices that 
are made regarding the tasks and size of the welfare state. Since corporatist institutions rely on 
how interest groups are involved in socio-economic policy-making, it can be expected that a 
greater involvement of these groups will have a strong impact on the creation and expansion of 
the welfare state and eventually on the reform of the system of welfare and care.
 Crepaz (1998) argues that parliamentary systems with proportional representation are 
more successful in representing the diffuse interests of the general public. In these systems 
political parties are stronger and capable of developing an extensive political programme, while 
in presidential systems with single member districts, such as the United States, parties are weak 
and legislators are pressured by lobbies. The majoritarian political system enables government 
to make radical policy changes. These changes can be totally reversed when a new government 
is installed. In a consensus democracy, policy is the result of a long process of compromising. 
Once actors have agreed on such a policy, it has a strong support and is quite difﬁcult to change 
and to reform certain given citizens  ʼrights, especially social rights. Therefore, it can be expected 
that welfare state provisions are more extensive in countries with a consensual political system. 
In a majoritarian democracy it is possible for a political party to gain political power and to 
implement an extreme policy programme. However, in the race between the two main parties 
to gain a majority vote, their programme is adjusted to please the median voter. In other words, 
the Downsian behaviour of political parties in a majoritarian system will decrease differences 
between available policy proposals.  The policy most likely to be chosen is found near the 
political centre.
 Corporatist institutional arrangements allow interest groups better access to the decision-
making process. In these systems, the demands of labour organisations for an extensive system 
of welfare provisions have a higher chance to be honoured by government and parliament. 
Government and legislators are more pressured by interest groups. Moreover, when unions are 
able to make agreements with employers  ʼorganisations, the other political players are more 
6willing to accept these agreements as a basis for their decision-making, because support of 
the main actors in the ﬁeld becomes a given. It can be argued that corporatism facilitates the 
development of a welfare state. What is the impact on welfare state reform? Two opposite 
effects are possible. On the one hand, established socio-economic policy is difﬁcult to change. 
Once workers have gained certain social rights, they will not be given up easily (Pierson 1994; 
2001; Kuhnle 2000). On the other hand, when both unions and employers organisations agree 
on a reform, it becomes easier for the political actors to make this decision (Ebbinghaus & 
Hassel 2000). The 1980s saw a decline of the inﬂuence of unions at the national level. Moreover 
unemployment increased rapidly. Unions were prepared to make agreements with employers  ʼ
organisations and government on wage moderation and welfare state reform. In return, trade 
unions were back at the negotiating-table, where they could regain inﬂuence, and hope for 
economic recovery, including more employment, which consequently would strengthen 
their position among the workforce. Corporatism is expected to coincide with higher welfare 
states until the mid1990s. Corporatist institutions have contributed to welfare retrenchment or 
moderation of welfare state growth in some countries in the 1990s.
 Table 1 gives an overview of the hypothesised effects of corporatism and consensus 
democracy on socio-economic performance. The institutions of consensus democracy are 
expected to neither have a positive nor a negative impact on performance. Institutions of 
consensus democracy play a role for political stability, but not for socio-economic policy, with 
the exception of social policy. Since more parties are involved in coalition government and 
minority groups have better access to the political arena, consensus democracy is expected 
to lead to higher social expenditures. Corporatism is expected to have no positive or negative 
effects on GDP per capita and economic growth, but it is expected to be related to socio-
economic performance indicator dealing with work, wages and prices. Because of coordinated 
and centralisation of groups action in a corporatist institutional setting, general interests are 
served better than in pluralist countries. In corporatist countries employers  ʼ organisations 
and trade unions are able to make agreements about wage moderation and stimulation of 
employment. Therefore, corporatism is expected to contribute to lower inﬂation rates and 
unemployment rates. Corporatism favours better access to decision-making and policy-making 
to many small groups than pluralism. In corporatist countries these groups have more and more 
efﬁcient channels to claim the development of social policy. Thus, corporatism is expected to 
be associated with higher social expenditures.
7Table 1 Hypotheses of the impact of institutions on performance
Type of 
performance
Consensus 
Democracy Corporatism Indicator used
GDP per capita Neutral Neutral GDP per capita (in constant US Dollars) OECD
Economic growth Neutral Neutral growth of real GDP (% change from previous year)
Unemployment Neutral Lower standardised unemployment rate OECD
Inﬂation Neutral Lower consumer price index (% change from previous year)
Misery index Neutral Lower unemployment plus inﬂation
Performance 
index Neutral Higher
economic growth minus inﬂation 
minus unemployment
Social 
expenditures Higher Higher
total social security beneﬁt 
expenditure as % of GDP
Table 1 shows that effects of consensus democracy and corporatism on performance are not 
expected to be the same. Consensus democracy only makes a difference for social expenditures, 
while corporatism also matters for unemployment and inﬂation. As a result, corporatism also 
has an impact on the misery index and the combined performance index.
 GDP per capita expresses the wealth of the population in a country. Economic growth 
measures the degree to which the economy is expanding. Unemployment measures the 
degree to which workers are able to ﬁnd a job. Low inﬂation rates indicate price stability, 
which means that peopleʼs purchasing power does not decline. Misery index expresses the 
mix of unemployment and inﬂation and a high degree of misery indicates a greater distance 
of the Phillips curve. The performance index combines economic growth, unemployment and 
inﬂation. Social expenditures show how much comparatively is spent to social policy.
Measures of consensus democracy and corporatism1
For analysing the impact on socio-economic performance, two new measurements of consensus 
democracy and corporatism are used. Consensus democracy can be seen as a special institutional 
arrangement between actors to overcome instability in the political system. The degree in which 
these institutions exist in a political system can vary between countries and through time. 
Consensus democracy is not an absolute state of an institutional context, but it can be used to 
compare political systems on the degree in which their institutions have consensual elements. 
 Lijphart (1984) operationalised the consensus versus majoritarian model of democracy 
in two dimensions. The ﬁrst dimension characterises the relations between parliament and the 
government, while the second dimension measures the degree to which constitutional features are 
federal and/or decentralised. This federal versus unitary dimension is not a good measurement of 
consensus democracy, since federalism has another function than consensus building practices. 
Moreover, the use of this dimension does not lead to a more precise ranking of countries on a 
consensus versus majoritarian scale. In Patterns of democracy Lijphart (1999) adds some indicators 
to his index of consensus democracy, such as the interest group system – which is more or less the 
same as corporatism – and the role of the central bank. 
8This paper uses a dynamic index of consensus democracy. As the most important 
characteristics of consensus democracy proportional representation and oversized coalitions are 
taken. These features of consensus democracy have been used to construct a new measurement. 
The indicators for proportional representation are parliamentary fragmentation (effective 
number of parliamentary parties), the disproportionality of the electoral system (reduction of 
the proportionality by taking the relative difference between the effective number of electoral 
and parliamentary parties) and a qualitative classiﬁcation the electoral system (from most to 
least proportional). The oversizedness of coalitions is measured by the proportion of minimal 
winning coalitions and the dominance of the government over opposition (surplus of the 
proportion of seats of a government coalition). These ﬁve indicators are calculated for twenty 
countries for each year from 1965 to 1998. For each country, the standardised z-scores of the 
ﬁve indicators are calculated. The sum of these ﬁve z-scores - again standardised - can be used 
to compare these twenty countries in this time period.
Corporatism can be considered a special institutional arrangement regarding socio-
economic policy-making between employers  ʼ organisations and trade unions. In contrast 
to pluralism, interest groups have special access to the process of policy-formation and 
implementation. Corporatist institutions are characterised by cooperation and consensus 
rather than conﬂict. The corporatism index is based on four indicators: centralisation of wage 
bargaining, coordination, union density and collective coverage rate. Figure 1 shows twenty 
democracies on the basis of their scores on consensus democracy and corporatism.
Figure 1 Consensus democracy and corporatism in twenty countries (1965-98).
Country labels: al = Australia, at = Austria, be = Belgium, ca = Canada, ch = Switzerland, de = Germany, dk = 
Denmark, es = Spain, ﬁ = Finland, fr = France, gr = Greece, ir = Ireland, it = Italy, nl = Netherlands, no = Norway, 
nz = New Zealand, pt = Portugal, se = Sweden, uk = United Kingdom and us = USA.
Source: Vergunst (2004: Figure 4.2, p. 79).
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9Empirical ﬁndings
The impact of institutional arrangements on several socio-economic indicators is examined for 
twenty developed democracies between 1965 and 1998. First, the mean scores of four clusters 
of countries are presented in graphs. Second, bivariate correlation coefﬁcients are presented. 
Third, several multivariate regression models are tested, in which the effects on socio-economic 
performance are controlled for contextual factors.
 On the basis of their scores on consensus democracy and corporatism, the twenty 
countries are divided in four clusters2. Cluster 4 consists of consensus and corporatist countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. Cluster 3 consists of consensus 
or corporatist countries: Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands. Cluster 2 consists of 
non-corporatist and non-consensual countries: Norway, Australia, Ireland, France, Portugal and 
Spain. Cluster 1 consists of majoritarian and pluralist countries: New Zealand, Canada, United 
Kingdom and USA. The mean scores of several performance indicators for these clusters in 
four time periods are visualised in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Socio-economic indicators per cluster
Sources: GDP per capita (in constant us dollars) and Economic growth (annual change of real GDP) from 
Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
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Figure 2 continued
Sources: standardised unemployment and inﬂation (consumer price index) OECD Economic Outlook, various 
years.
The ﬁrst graph in Figure 2 shows that clusters 4 and 3 (i.e. countries with both consensus 
democracy and corporatism or with one of these) have the highest levels of GDP per capita. 
Cluster 2 (non-corporatist and non-consensus) has the highest economic growth. Cluster 2 also 
has the highest levels of both unemployment and inﬂation. The countries in cluster 4 have 
lower levels of both unemployment and inﬂation than the other groups. From Figure 2 it can be 
concluded that cluster 2 performs worst in terms of GDP per capita, unemployment and inﬂation, 
but is doing best in average economic growth. This last result might be an indication that this 
group of countries is catching up. Countries in cluster 4 perform better on unemployment, 
inﬂation and GDP per capita, but have lower levels of economic growth than the other groups. 
In general, this means that the combination of consensus democracy and corporatism (cluster 4) 
leads to a performance that is better than for cluster 2 and at least equally good as or even better 
than cluster 1 (majoritarian and pluralist).
11
 Instead of taking some separate indicators of performance, a composite index of 
performance can be constructed. Performance is calculated as economic growth minus inﬂation 
minus unemployment3.
Figure 3 Performance index by cluster
Sources: Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000); OECD Economic Outlook, 
various years; own calculations.
If we look at the means of both indexes for the four clusters, it conﬁrms the picture that the 
combined model of corporatism and consensus democracy has a slightly better performance 
than the others in the 1970s and 1980s, but this advantage disappeared in the 1990s. The worst 
performance is found in the non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic category.
 The graphs in Figure 2 and 3 do not only indicate the cross-national patterns, but show the 
dynamic dimension as well. GDP per capita increases in all four categories and the differences 
between the clusters are increasing as well. This indicates a diverging pattern in terms of GDP 
per capita. Economic growth was highest in all four categories in the ﬁrst period, 1965-74. 
After the ﬁrst oil shock of 1974 economic growth declined. In the periods after 1974 average 
growth for these categories stabilised between 2 and 3% a year. Unemployment increased in 
all clusters, although differences in growth of unemployment can be seen for these categories. 
Unemployment increased strongest for the non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic 
cluster, while the other clusters stabilised around an unemployment rate of 8% in the last period. 
An interesting result is that unemployment in the consensus and corporatist cluster increased 
later than in the other clusters. This shows why studies published in the 1980s were still 
positive about the impact of corporatism on unemployment. This positive effect of corporatism 
disappeared in the 1990s. Inﬂation shows an interesting pattern of rise and decline. Inﬂation was 
highest for all categories between 1975 and 1984, with a record for the non-corporatist and non-
consensus democratic category of 15%. After this period, inﬂation decreased for all categories. 
Combined with rising unemployment rates, in the same period 1975-84, these countries coped 
with a serious stagﬂation crisis.
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 Although Figures 2 and 3 give a general overview of the cross-national and diachronic 
patterns, it is only a rough indication of the empirical relationship between institutional variables 
and several macro-economic variables. Table 2 shows bivariate correlation coefﬁcients between 
institutional variables and performance indicators. Again these results are rough, but they are 
helpful in comparing them with results found in other studies and in looking at developments 
through time.
 In general, the correlation coefﬁcients between the institutional variables and economic 
variables in Table 2 are weak, with the exception of social expenditures. Corporatism has a signiﬁcant 
positive effect on social expenditures, that increases through time. Consensus democracy also has 
an increasing positive effect, but not as strong.
 The other correlations are much weaker and only signiﬁcant in a few cases. Corporatism 
is very weakly to not related to the levels of the GDP per capita and economic growth. Both 
consensus democracy and corporatism have a slight lowering impact on unemployment levels, 
but this effect disappeared in the 1990s. Consensus democracy has a slight lowering effect on 
inﬂation rates, while there is almost no relationship between corporatism and inﬂation. The 
impact of consensus democracy on GDP per capita, inﬂation, misery index and performance 
index is stronger than that of corporatism. For these performance indicators, the combined effect 
of corporatism and consensus democracy is slightly stronger than the impact of the separate 
indicators. The fact that Lijphart (1999) includes corporatism as an indicator of consensus 
democracy explains his optimism about the relationship he found. It seems that Anderson (2001) 
is right in his critique on Lijphart that his index of consensus democracy is not accurate because 
it contains factors that do not belong to the institutional arrangements of consensus democracy. 
The indexes used in this paper are clearer and enable an analysis of the different institutions 
of corporatism and consensus democracy without mixing them. This means that not only on 
theoretical grounds consensus democracy and corporatism must be separated, empirically these 
institutions seem to have different effects on socio-economic performance.
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Table 2 Correlation coefﬁcients between institutional and socio-economic variables
Correlations Economic growth
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy 0.12 -0.25 -0.12 -0.28 -0.26
corporatism -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.17 -0.06
GDP per capita
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy -0.06 0.35 0.47** 0.44* 0.45**
corporatism -0.25 -0.03 0.05 0.21 0.11
Unemployment rate
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy -0.36 -0.20 -0.39* -0.11 -0.33
corporatism -0.43* -0.35 -0.20 0.13 -0.28
social expenditures
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy 0.27 0.33 0.41* 0.48** 0.37
corporatism 0.52* 0.49* 0.54** 0.72** 0.55**
Inﬂation
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy -0.01 -0.36 -0.25 -0.15 -0.31
corporatism 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.05
Misery index
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy -0.30 -0.36 -0.45** -0.15 -0.39*
corporatism -0.30 -0.19 -0.16 0.12 -0.20
Performance index
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy 0.27 0.30 0.36 -0.05 0.31
corporatism 0.18 0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.18
Signiﬁcance * 10% ** 5%
Correlation coefﬁcients are calculated over averages for each country for each period; number of cases is 20, 
except for 1965-74, n = 17 (Greece, Spain and Portugal are excluded). 
Sources: Economic growth (annual change of real GDP) and GDP per capita in constant US Dollars 
(Comparative Political Data Set, provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000); unemployment: 
standardized unemployment rates; Inﬂation: consumer price index (OECD Economic outlook, various years).
Misery index = unemployment + inﬂation (own calculations)
Performance index = economic growth – unemployment - inﬂation (own calculations)
The conclusion from the bivariate correlations is that the impact of the institutional variables on 
some macro-economic performance indicators generally is hardly signiﬁcant. Corporatism and 
consensus democracy have a modest lowering effect on unemployment and inﬂation rates and 
have a weak positive relation to GDP per capita and economic growth, which is not constant 
through time. The lowering effect of corporatism on unemployment clearly declined through time. 
Corporatism and to a lesser extent consensus democracy seem to matter for social policy. These 
institutions are related to more social expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
 Compared with other results, such as Schmidt (1982); Crepaz (1992; 1998); Lijphart 
(1999) the results of Table 2 are considerably weaker. These former studies did not analyse 
exactly the same countries for the same time periods. Moreover, in Table 2 several time periods 
are analysed separately. The most important explanation of these deviating results appears to 
be that corporatism had an impact on unemployment and inﬂation in the past, but this effect 
disappeared altogether.
14
 After the presentation of mean scores and bivariate correlations, several models are 
tested in multivariate regressions. The multivariate models measure the extent to which there is 
a combined effect of corporatism and consensus democracy and these effects can be controlled 
for other factors. The main goal of empirical testing is to ﬁnd the impact of institutions, not 
the level and changes of the performance indicators as such. Finding the best ﬁtting model 
is balancing between a model that is parsimonious on the one hand and a model containing 
all relevant factors on the other hand. Tables 3 to 8 present several models of the impact of 
institutions on performance. These models are calculated for twenty countries and the averages 
for three time periods (1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98). The ﬁrst period, 1965-74, is not included 
in the analysis, because no scores for the institutional models in this period for Greece, Spain 
and Portugal are available. Using three time periods increases the number of cases to 60 instead 
of 20, but it does not lead to serious problems of autocorrelation, because of the limited time 
span. A second problem that may but does not occur is multicollinearity, which means that the 
independent variables are highly correlated.4
 With three periods and twenty countries there is variation through time and across 
countries. The time component is very limited, and the models are not really pooled time series. 
Using annual scores between 1975 and 1998, increases the number of time points, but lead to 
replication of some of the variables, in particular the corporatism scores which are measured 
for the periods 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98. Therefore, variation over three time periods and 
twenty countries is examined.
 To examine if variation over time or across nations is highest, an ANOVA5 is calculated 
for each of the performance indicators. Variation over time is greater than variation across 
nations for inﬂation (consumer price index) and GDP per capita (in constant US Dollars). 
Variation across nations is greater than over time for unemployment, economic growth (annual 
change of real GDP), misery index (unemployment and inﬂation), performance index and 
social expenditures. This means that the time dimension is dominant for inﬂation and GDP 
per capita and that differences between countries are most important for the other performance 
indicators. 
 For each performance indicator, several regression models are tested. The ﬁrst model 
presented includes the institutional variables and contextual variables that yield signiﬁcant 
coefﬁcients. The other models are a parsimonious model and a model with only the institutional 
variables included. The ﬁrst analysed performance indicator is inﬂation, which is shown in 
Table 3.
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Table 3 Regression models of the impact on inﬂation (Consumer price index)
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy -0.533 (0.409) -0.103 -1.489 (0.780) -0.287*
corporatism -0.656 (0.410) -0.128  0.671 (0.769)  0.131 -0.947 (0.346) -0.185**
openness of the economy -1.970 (0.156) -0.864*** -2.007 (0.154) -0.880***
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.06 0.74
degrees of freedom 56 57 57
Dependent variable: inﬂation (consumer price index)
b: unstandardised coefﬁcients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coefﬁcients
signiﬁcance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Vergunst (2004: Table 2.7); corporatism Vergunst (2004: Table 3.4); Openness 
economy: index for the ﬁnancial openness of an economy6 (Comparative Political Data Set, provided by 
Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000)
In Table 3 three models are tested that can have an impact on inﬂation, measured by the consumer 
price index. The ﬁrst model takes consensus democracy, corporatism and openness of the 
economy (measured by an additive index of restrictions on payments and receipts of goods and 
invisibles, restrictions on payments and receipts of capital and legal international agreements 
that constrain a nationʼs ability to restrict exchange and capital ﬂows (Armingeon, Beyeler 
& Menegale 2000)) as independent variables. For this model, there is no strong impact of 
institutions. Openness of the economy is signiﬁcantly related to lower inﬂation rates. Although 
the impact of corporatism is not signiﬁcant, in this model corporatism together with openness 
lowers signiﬁcantly the inﬂation level. This seems in line with arguments made by Katzenstein 
(1985) that small open countries use corporatism as a strategy to cope with international 
competition. When openness of the economy is removed, as in model 2, the explained variance, 
as expressed by R2, is very low and consensus democracy has a signiﬁcantly but very small 
lowering impact on inﬂation. When consensus democracy is omitted, as in model 3, corporatism 
and openness of the economy together have a mitigating impact on inﬂation.
Table 4 Regression models of the impact on unemployment
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy -0.242 (0.549) -0.060 -0.814 (0.612) -0.202
corporatism -0.745 (0.524) -0.188 -0.008 (0.604) -0.002
central bank independence -1.191 (0.470) -0.295* -1.246 (0.444) -0.308***
EU membership  3.390 (0.883)  0.497***  3.636 (0.881)  0.453***
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.01 0.29
degrees of freedom 55 57 57
Dependent variable: unemployment rate.
b: unstandardised coefﬁcients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coefﬁcients
signiﬁcance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Vergunst (2004: Table 2.7); corporatism Vergunst (2004: Table 3.4); Central bank 
Independence: sum of the z-scores of central bank independence of Franzese & Hall (2000: 198) and Busch 
(1993: 60)7.
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Table 4 presents three regression models on unemployment. Institutions have no signiﬁcant 
impact. In the ﬁrst model, central bank independence has a lowering effect on unemployment, 
while EU countries have higher unemployment rates. When the institutional variables are 
removed, as in model 3, the effect of the control variables remains the same. This means that 
both consensus democracy and corporatism have no impact on unemployment. This result holds 
when controlled for other factors and only these institutions are examined. Institutions do not 
seem to matter with regard to unemployment. 
Table 5 Regression models of the impact on misery index
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy -0.068 (0.516) -0.011 -2.303 (0.894) -0.377*
corporatism -0.737(0.587) -0.122  0.663 (0.882) -0.110
central bank independence -1.013 (0.480) -0.165* -1.009 (0.466) -0.165*
work days lost (log)  2.283 (0,523)  0.363***  2.716 (0.428)  0.432***
EU membership  4.173 (0.891)  0.343***  3.627 (0.828)  0.298***
openness of the economy -1.636 (0.218) -0.609*** -1.510 (0.204) -0.562***
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.08 0.76
degrees of freedom 53 57 55
Dependent variable: misery index (unemployment and inﬂation).
b: unstandardised coefﬁcients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coefﬁcients
signiﬁcance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Vergunst (2004: Table 2.7); corporatism Vergunst (2004: Table 3.4); Central bank 
independence: sum of the z-scores of central bank independence of Franzese & Hall (2000: 198) and Busch 
(1993: 60); log of work days lost due to strike Comparative Political Data Set (2000); openness economy: index 
for the ﬁnancial openness of an economy (Comparative Political Data Set, provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & 
Menegale 2000). 
Table 5 shows regression models of the misery index, which is the combination of inﬂation 
and unemployment. Consensus democracy has a lowering effect on the misery index in model 
2, but when control variables are added this effect disappears, as in model 1. Central bank 
independence has a very weak, signiﬁcant lowering effect on the misery index. Open economies 
are associated with a lower degree of misery and (the logarithm of) the number of work days 
lost due to strike and EU membership is associated with a higher degree of misery. Again, 
institutions are not actually related to the misery index. This is in line with the ﬁnding that 
institutions are not related with unemployment.
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Table 6 Regression models of the impact on performance
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy  0.014 (0.103)  0.018  0.181 (0.116)  0.238
corporatism  0.115 (0.101)  0.154 -0.088 (0.114) -0.118
central bank independence  0.237 (0.099)  0.311*  0.258 (0.093)  0.337**
EU membership -0.601 (0.179) -0.396*** -0.527 (0171) -0.348**
openness of the economy  0.115 (0.044)  0.343*  0.097 (0.042)  0.289*
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.04 0.33
degrees of freedom 54 57 56
Dependent variable: performance index (economic growth minus unemployment minus inﬂation).
b: unstandardised coefﬁcients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coefﬁcients
signiﬁcance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Vergunst (2004: Table 2.7); corporatism  Vergunst (2004: Table 3.4); Central 
bank independence: sum of the z-scores of central bank independence of Franzese & Hall (2000: 198) and Busch 
(1993: 60); openness economy: index for the ﬁnancial openness of an economy (Comparative Political Data Set, 
provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
Table 6 shows no signiﬁcant impact of institutions on the overall performance index. Central 
bank independence is related to better socio-economic performance. According to the ﬁrst and 
third model independent central banks and open economies have higher performance and EU 
members have lower performance levels, but the effects are not strong.
 The positive conclusions of Lijphart (1999) and Crepaz (1996) about the impact of 
consensus democracy are not reﬂected in the ﬁndings presented here. It becomes clear that one 
of the indicators that is part of Lijphartʼs operationalisation of consensus democracy, central 
bank independence, has a stronger effect than the index of consensus democracy. This means 
that using a broad operationalisation as done by Lijphart (1999), that includes variables such 
as central bank independence, leads to conclusions that overestimate the positive effect of 
consensus democracy.
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Table 7 Regression models GDP per capita (in 1000 constant US Dollars)
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy  1.618 (0.726)  0.200*  3.146 (1.179)  0.390**
corporatism  1.539 (0.708)  0.193* -1.077 (1.163) -0.135
industrial employment -0.891 (0.132) -0.557*** -0.785 (0.150) -0.491***
central bank independence  2.731 (0.757)  0.337***  3.144 (0.832)  0.388***
openness of the economy  1.412 (0.310)  0.398***  1.290 (0.358)  0.363***
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.08 0.60
degrees of freedom 54 57 56
b: unstandardised coefﬁcients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coefﬁcients
signiﬁcance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Vergunst (2004: Table 2.7); corporatism Vergunst (2004: Table 3.4); industrial 
employment: employment in industry as % of total employment(OECD Labour Force Statistics 2000); Central 
bank independence: sum of the z-scores of central bank independence of Franzese & Hall (2000: 198) and Busch 
(1993: 60); openness economy: index for the ﬁnancial openness of an economy (Comparative Political Data Set, 
provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
Consensus democracy is associated with higher GDP per capita and this effect is smaller 
when controlled for other factors. The impact of corporatism on GDP per capita is very small. 
Openness of the economy and central bank independence are much more important. Industrial 
employment is associated with lower GDP per capita. Countries with relatively more industrial 
employment did not develop economically as strong as those countries with a less.
Table 8 Regression models of the impact on social expenditures
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy  0.838 (0.613)  0.130 0.969 (0.831) 0.150
corporatism  3.128 (0.641)  0.492*** 2.950 (0.820) 0.464***  3.650 (0.518)  0.574***
federalism -2.208 (0.630) -0.309*** -1.947 (0.604) -0.272**
openness of the economy  1.801 (0.230)  0.635***  1.833 (0.230)  0.646***
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.29 0.66
degrees of freedom 55 57 56
Dependent variable: social expenditures (as % of GDP).
b: unstandardised coefﬁcients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coefﬁcients
signiﬁcance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Vergunst (2004: Table 2.7); corporatism Vergunst (2004: Table 3.4); federalism 
1=unitary, 3=federal (Lane & Ersson 1994a; own estimations added); openness economy: index for the ﬁnancial 
openness of an economy (Comparative Political Data Set, provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
Table 8 shows the impact on social expenditures (as % of GDP). This is the ﬁrst and only 
performance indicator that shows a signiﬁcant positive impact of corporatism that lasts if 
control variables are added. Corporatist countries have a larger welfare state. This effect is 
controlled for federalism and open economy. In federal countries, central government is less 
dominant and there can be more competition between states to moderate taxes. This contributes 
to smaller welfare states in federal countries (Pierson 1995). Open economies have a larger 
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welfare state. Open economies are more vulnerable to international factors and can therefore 
develop a stronger welfare state to protect workers against unexpected risks. Moreover, as 
shown in Table 7, countries with open economies are richer and this can make it easier for these 
countries to develop larger welfare states.
Conclusions
This paper has examined several possible effects of institutional arrangements on performance. 
Consensus democracy and corporatism appeared to have not a straightforward positive effect on 
socio-economic performance.  The conclusions made by Lijphart and Crepaz are overestimated, 
since they use a broad operationalisation of consensus democracy that includes corporatism and 
central bank independence. The positive correlations in their analyses are not explained by 
consensual institutions, but by other variables. 
 Consensus democracy is indeed connected with lower misery (unemployment 
and inﬂation), but the impact of central bank independence is much stronger. Institutional 
arrangements of consensus democracy and corporatism are not positively related to a general 
performance index.
 Countries that neither belong to corporatism and consensus democracy, nor to pluralism 
and majoritarianism - performed worse than the countries that belong to one side of the scale. 
This means that choosing one of both models pays off instead of keeping in the middle. This 
seems to ﬁt Calmfors & Drifﬁllʼs hump-shaped relationship between corporatist institutions and 
inﬂation. Centralised and decentralised wage bargaining systems show indeed lower inﬂation 
rates than intermediate systems.
 The lowering effect of corporatism on unemployment has become weaker. This indicates 
that the effect of corporatist institutions has become smaller and corporatism has become less 
important. This conﬁrms the argument made by Therborn and Flanagan that the impact of 
corporatism is on the decline.
 The most important ﬁnding of this paper is that in analysing the impact of institutions 
on performance, too broad conceptualisations and operationalisations should not be used. 
Moreover, this paper shows that consensus democracy and corporatism have different effects 
on performance and these different types of institutions each have their own dynamics. This 
means that these institutions must not be confused, but clearly be separated. Each of them has 
different institutional characteristics and shows a different impact. They are certainly not the 
same. Another ﬁnding of this paper is that neither consensus democracy nor corporatism has a 
very strong and direct impact on socio-economic performance. Many effects that were found 
are weak and most of the effects were dependent on or under condition of other factors, such as 
the openness of the economy and central bank independence. This means that the institutions of 
consensus democracy and corporatism can have positive effects on socio-economic performance, 
but this effect is conditional. There is no empirical ground to believe that the institutions of 
consensus democracy and corporatism contribute to better socio-economic performance.
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Notes
1 The measurements of consensus democracy and corporatism are explained in more detail in Chapter 4 of 
Vergunst (2004).
2 These four cluster are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of Vergunst (2004).
3 Standardised scores are used.
4 Multicollinearity is tested by examining the Variance Inﬂation Factor (VIF). In none of the regressions reported 
here, tolerance is below 0.45. Tolerance = 1/VIF. For critical values of tolerance see Pennings, Keman & 
Kleinnijenhuis (1999: 199-200).
5 Analysis of Variance (see Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis 1999: 141-144).
6 This index is measured by restrictions on payments and receipts of goods and invisibles, restrictions on 
payments and receipts of capital and legal international agreements that constrain a nationʼs ability to restrict 
exchange and capital ﬂows (Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
7 For the CBI index, means of scores from both authors are used.
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